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A B S T R A C T
We consider two firms which pool some of their inventory. The pool is created by the firms' contributions, and a
firm's entitlement for an allocation from the pool (if needed) is a function of its contribution. Transshipment
from the pool is costly, but the firms can benefit from reduced risk through inventory sharing using the pool. We
analyze the resulting non-cooperative game. We prove existence of a Nash equilibrium and compare it to a model
with centralized control. An appropriate compensation cost for using the other firms contribution to the pool can
induce the retailers to achieve centralized solutions. We also compare the optimal partial pooling strategy to the
special cases of no pooling and complete pooling and discuss situations where it is likely that one of the special
cases will be optimal. Numerical results confirm that in the prevalent practice of partial pooling the retailers can
achieve higher expected profits than under no pooling or complete pooling and that there is a significant dif-
ference between a setting with independent players and a model of central control.
1. Introduction
When demands are uncertain, pooling inventories is a common
practice in multi-location inventory management. Pooling allows to
benefit from reduced effective demand risk, in particular reduced risks
of facing stockouts and leftovers, which increases profits and service
levels (Eppen, 1979). For example, instead of having local inventories
in each demand location, inventories can be physically pooled at a
central storage facility. It can be also achieved through virtual pooling
(i.e. transshipments) by transshipping excess inventory to demand lo-
cations facing stockouts. Other prevalent forms of inventory pooling
include strategies such as postponement, product substitution and
component commonality.
Traditionally, work in that area assumed central control. But if the
parties (say, retailers) involved are independent firms there is an issue
of how much will they contribute to the pool, and how will pooled units
be allocated if needed. That may be determined by bargaining. We
shall, however, use a different approach: The parties that contribute to
the pool, will be assumed to have precedence for the units they con-
tributed and be able to use units contributed to the pool by the other
party if not needed (Ben-Zvi and Gerchak, 2012; Gerchak, 2016). Note
that Müller et al. (2002) proved that the core of this game is not empty;
so all parties can benefit from pooling.
Here we consider the common practice scenario of physical
centralization of inventories at a warehouse where, in addition to
pooled units, the retailers can also keep units in their sites (i.e., at the
retail level). That gives rise to partial pooling.
In a partial pooling system each retailer selects its own inventory
and its contribution to the central warehouse (see Gerchak (2017) for a
centrally controlled setting). Using a central warehouse for deliveries to
retailers who are short, which is quite common, essentially implies that
transshipping among retailers (virtual pooling) is not practical. Thus
retailers who use a central warehouse in that way are examples of our
scenario. Here it will be assumed that delivery of other firm's units at
the warehouse involves payment and transshipments between retail
stores is prohibitively expensive. Costs of initial placement of units in
the pool and stores may be different, and the model also includes de-
livery costs from the pool to customers.
While the practice of partial pooling occurs quite often, it has been
rarely studied in the literature. It is quite common that retailers hold
some inventory at their sites for the part of demand that is (almost)
certain to occur and additional pooled inventory at a central warehouse
for the considerably uncertain part of demand. Stocked out retailers are
then searching items at the warehouse when transshipments at the re-
tail level are not possible or highly expensive. Such arrangement, for
example, is given in the case of a shoe company described in Wee and
Dada (2005), where the warehouse is the only source for replenishment
in stockout situations. Narus and Anderson (1996) provide various
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practical examples for such flexible distribution channels. Kurata
(2014) discusses the example of a parent company of Seven Eleven
Japan that has established an online shopping system where customers
can choose between home delivery or a pick-up at a conveniently lo-
cated store. In such omni-channel systems an appropriate allocation of
inventory between a central warehouse and the stores is a key issue
(Kurata, 2014). Amrani and Khmelnitsky (2017) describe an example of
maintenance of avionic systems where items are kept in a two-echelon
supply chain. A large depot supplies a number of geographically dis-
persed bases facing stochastic demand that provide items from local
inventory first. In a non-commercial setting partial pooling occurs for
humanitarian organizations that usually have their own warehouses for
relief items to respond to a disaster but can also store relief items at a
depot of the UNHRD to benefit from risk pooling and save costs
(Toyasaki et al., 2017).
Note that our work is the first to analyze a partial pooling system
assuming independent retailers. As outlined in Wee and Dada (2005)
partial pooling is especially appropriate in organizational structures
such as franchising arrangements where independent retailers co-
operate in terms of sharing a central warehouse. This actually supports
our model assumption.
The aim of this paper is to analyze such a partial pooling model with
two independent retailers, resulting in a non-cooperative game.
Thereby, the key question is how retailers should optimally set their
inventory levels at the stores and the central warehouse. First, the
special cases of complete pooling and no pooling are discussed that
allows us to benchmark the partial pooling system and to identify in
which situation it is likely that one of two special cases will be optimal.
We then provide a detailed description of a partial pooling inventory
system and prove joint concavity of the expected profit functions under
both centralized and decentralized control. Analytical results are
complemented by numerical examples in order to study the perfor-
mance of partial pooling for independent retailers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
briefly review relevant literature related to inventory pooling with in-
dependent players and to the concept of partial pooling. Section 3 de-
scribes the problem setting and the assumptions of our model. The
special cases of no pooling and complete pooling which serve as
benchmarks are analyzed in Section 4. The mathematical model of
partial pooling and structural results complemented by numerical ex-
amples and managerial insights from our analysis are given in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings and discusses potential
future research directions.
2. Literature
Literature on risk pooling with independent retailers, constituting a
non-cooperative game, mostly focuses on inventory sharing systems
with lateral transshipments, i.e. inventory sharing between locations on
the same echelon (e.g. Rudi et al., 2001; Hu et al., 2007; Shao et al.,
2011; Arikan and Silbermayr, 2018) or substitution (e.g. Parlar, 1988;
Lippman and McCardle, 1997; Netessine and Rudi, 2003; Cachon and
Netessine, 2006). These risk pooling systems are different from our
setting. Our focus is on physically centralizing inventory of the retailers
into a single location. Further, we do not consider any demand sub-
stitution.
Literature focusing on physical pooling of inventories at a central
warehouse mostly assume that inventories for multiple locations are
managed centrally (e.g. Eppen, 1979; Chen and Lin, 1989; Gerchak and
He, 2003; Corbett and Rajaram, 2006; Silbermayr et al., 2017) or as-
sumes a cooperative newsvendor game (e.g. Hartman et al., 2000;
Hartman and Dror, 2005; Slikker et al., 2005; Fiestras-Janeiro et al.,
2011). This may be due to the fact that for a system with more than two
locations one needs a proper allocation rule for assigning the joint stock
to the retailers, if several retailers are facing a stockout situation.
Finding an appropriate allocation rule is a key issue in decentralized
inventory systems with more than two locations. However, this is not
the focus of this work.
Ben-Zvi and Gerchak (2012) consider physical pooling of in-
ventories with two independent firms differing in their shortage cost.
They assume that a retailer facing a stockout situation will receive an
allocation proportional to its contribution to the pool. Gerchak (2016)
analyze consequences of such a non-cooperative game with a modified
scheme that is beneficial to all parties relative to a no pooling situation.
Both papers assume that it is costless for retailers to use residual stock
from the other retailers' contribution to the joint stock. We, on the other
hand, have the user of other's contribution to the pool pay for that. Here
we shall allow partial pooling, so each retailer has to choose its own
inventory and its contribution to the pool.
Partial pooling has only been studied for the case of centrally
managed inventory systems, except for Anupindi et al. (2001) who, in
contrast to our approach, consider a model where independent retailers
after demand is realized cooperatively determine how to share residual
inventory and divide the profit from pooling according to an allocation
rule specified at the beginning of the game. Wee and Dada (2005)
consider a centrally managed partial pooling model with transship-
ments between the retailers and delivery from a warehouse. Hence,
their model is a combination of physical pooling of inventories and
lateral transshipments. They provide results pertaining to when it is
optimal to open a warehouse. Amrani and Khmelnitsky (2017) study a
partial pooling model similar to Wee and Dada (2005) where the total
amount of inventory is fixed. Gerchak (2017) considers partial pooling
as a combination of i) physical pooling and ii) decentralized storage at
the retail locations, i.e. transshipments between retail stores is prohi-
bitively expensive. Conditions are derived for a partial pooling solution
to be locally superior to a no pooling solution. Kurata (2014) studies a
model with one supplier and multiple identical retailers where items
can be stocked at the retail level and at the supplier in order to find the
optimal allocation of items in such a two-echelon inventory system.
In this paper we study a system of partial pooling as in Gerchak
(2017), but we assume that the retailers are independent firms. Such a
partial pooling system results in a non-cooperative game in which the
retailers independently determine their inventory quantities at the store
and the pool and have precedence for the units they contributed to the
pool. Further, we will compare it to a centrally managed model and also
discuss special cases of partial pooling (no pooling and complete
pooling).
3. Problem description and assumptions
Consider two independent retailers, i and j, with continuous random
demands X F X F~ , ~i X j Xi j (for an example with discrete demand we refer
to Appendix A).
The retailers have to choose their own stocks, qi and qj, and their
contributions to the common stock at the central warehouse, Qi and Qj,
that then becomes = +Q Q Qi j. We assume that the warehouse is the
only source that delivers inventory to the retailers in case of a stockout,
as transshipments between the retailers is prohibitively expensive
(Gerchak, 2017). The cost of placing a unit at a retailer are cR, while the
cost of placing a unit at the pool are cP. Hence, any difference in cR and
cP can be due to asymmetries in ordering and storage cost between the
central warehouse and a store at the retail level. For example, the cost
of the common warehouse could be indirectly captured by the purchase
cost at the pool (cP) being higher than the purchase cost at a retailer
(cR). Note that cP also captures the initial investment for establishing the
common facility. Any delivery from the pool incurs a transportation
cost of t per unit. So establishing a central warehouse will be only
beneficial if the advantage of inventory pooling exceed these extra
costs. The revenue per unit sold is r. Thus both retailers are assumed to
have same revenue and placing cost per unit.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, retailers place orders for
their own inventories and their contributions to the pool
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simultaneously. Then, demands realize and each retailer uses its own
stock from the retail location and the pool. If demand of retailer i ex-
ceeds its own total stock +q Qi i, then it may use retailer j's surplus stock
at the pool at the per unit compensation cost τ. The same holds for
retailer j.
That is, we assume that each retailer has precedence over its con-
tribution to the pool. If it does not need (part of) it, the other retailer
can use it. If retailer i uses a portion of retailer j's pool Qj, it has to pay j
a compensation cost of τ per unit (the same holds for retailer j if it uses a
portion of Qi).
To avoid trivial solutions we assume that , > +r t and
r t[0, ]. The notation is summarized in Table 1 and an overview of
the model is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We presume that the compensation cost τ is defined in advance
which can be also observed in practice for such cooperative arrange-
ment (Narus and Anderson, 1996). The compensation cost for using the
other retailers surplus stock at the pool will have a direct implication on
retailers’ profitability, consequently a discussion on how this compen-
sation cost τ is set is needed. It may be either set by some external
authority (such as e.g. a common supplier or third party logistic pro-
vider) or it needs to be determined at the outset, plausibly by bar-
gaining (for example, Nash bargaining). In the later case, for retailer i
and j with disagreement value, di and dj, which will be its expected no
pooling profit one will be using the value of τ which will maximize the
product Eu d Eu d[ ( ) ][ ( ) ]i i j j , with Eu (.)i and Eu (.)j being the ex-
pected utility functions representing the preferences of retailer i and j.
That cooperative phase and the subsequent non-cooperative game will
constitute a “bi-form” game (see Brandenburger and Stuart (2007);
Hanany et al. (2006)).
Hence, in the following we examine the non-cooperative inventory
decisions of partial pooling for any r t[0, ], that is either exo-
genously given or alternatively already set by bargaining at the fore-
going cooperative phase of the game (similar to the approach of e.g.
Rudi et al. (2001) and Shao et al. (2011) where, however, only local
storage with pooling via transshipments is considered).
The compensation cost plays an important role in determining the
benefits of (partial) pooling for each retailer (see Sections 4.2 and 5.3
where we discuss the impact of varying τ). Hence, we will compare our
model to a centrally controlled model where a single decision maker is
maximizing the expected aggregated profit and consequently compen-
sation costs do not matter.
As for the inventory policies of the retailers we distinguish between
the following cases:
• =Q 0 No Pooling (NP) with policy (q q, , 0iNP jNP )• = =q q 0i j Complete Pooling (CP) with policy ( Q0,0, CP)• >q q Q, , 0i j Partial Pooling with policy (q q Q, ,i j ).
In case of a centralized decision maker, it is well known that,
without transportation costs t and equal purchase costs, the expected
profits satisfy Q q q(0,0, ) , , 0CP i NP j NP* * * always (e.g., Eppen,
1979; Gerchak and He, 2003).
Recently it was shown by Gerchak (2017), in a centralized scenario
with transportation costs from the pool, that it is possible that>q q Q Q, , (0,0, )i j CP* * * * and >q q Q q q, , , , 0i j i NP j NP* * * * * for>q q Q, , 0i j* * * , so partial pooling can be strictly optimal. Note that if one
wishes the partial pooling solution to be better than no pooling for every
demand realization one needs to have + + +q q Q q qi j iNP jNP (see
Hartman and Dror, 2005). We shall not impose that requirement.
Table 1
Notation.
Xi stochastic demand of retailer i with distribution function FXi
Q Q( )i i* (optimal) inventory quantity of i placed at central location/pool
q q( )i i
* (optimal) inventory quantity of i at retail location i
Qi CP* optimal inventory quantity of i placed at central location/pool underspecial case of complete pooling
qi
NP* optimal inventory quantity of i at retail location i under special case of
no pooling
r per unit revenue
cP per unit purchase cost at the pool
cR per unit purchase cost at the retail locations
t per unit transportation cost from the pool to retailers
τ per unit compensation cost for using the competitor's pool
i expected profit of retailer i
i
k expected profit of retailer i under special case k CP NP{ , }
total expected profit of retailer i and j
k total expected profit of retailer i and j under special case k CP NP{ , }
Fig. 1. Partial pooling system.
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4. No pooling and complete pooling
First, we will consider the two extreme special cases of partial
pooling - no pooling and complete pooling - which are easier to analyze,
and provide us a benchmark for evaluating any partial pooling.
4.1. No pooling
If =Q 0 then there is no inventory pooling involved in the system
(see Fig. 1) and the problem for retailer i reduces to the standard
newsvendor problem. No expenditures associated with a warehouse are
incurred. The expected profit of retailer i is= +r c q rE q X( ) ( ) ,iNP R i i i (1)
where =+X Xmax( , 0).
The expected profit maximizing inventory =q i, 1,2i NP* satisfies=F q r c
r
( ) ,X i
R
i (2)
where r c
r
R is the critical ratio of the standard newsvendor problem.
4.2. Complete pooling
If = =q q 0i j , then the two independent retailers have to only
choose their contributions to the common stock, Qi and Qj, that then
becomes = +Q Q Qi j. Here cR is irrelevant and stores can eliminate
their storage space. In this case each sale will require a delivery from
the pool to the retail locations at cost t. Supplying retailer i from j's pool
additionally incur a per unit compensation cost τ. We refer to this
transfer as crossji. Note that even if = 0 a retailer has an incentive to
contribute to the pool (rather than ‘rely’ only on the other retailer's
contribution), as then larger demands can be satisfied, increasing the
expected revenue.
To obtain the expected profit of retailer i under continuous demand
we consider eight distinct cases.
1. If x Qi i and x Qj j =sales xi i, = =cross cross 0ji ij
2. If +Q x Q Qi i i j and + > +Q Q x xi j i j =sales xi i,= =cross x Q cross, 0ji i i ij
3. If +Q x Q Qi i i j, + +Q Q x xi j i j and >Q xj j= +sales Q Q xi i j j, = =cross Q x cross, 0ji j j ij
4. If > +x Q Qi i j and >Q xj j = +sales Q Q xi i j j,
= =cross Q x cross, 0ji j j ij
5. If x Qi i and x Qj j =sales Qi i, = =cross cross 0ji ij
6. If >x Q x Q,i i j j and + > +Q Q x xi j i j =sales xi i,= =cross cross x Q0,ji ij j j
7. If x Qi i, + +Q Q x xi j i j and +x Q Qj i j =sales xi i,= =cross cross Q x0,ji ij i i
8. If x Qi i, + +Q Q x xi j i j and > +x Q Qj i j =sales xi i,= =cross cross Q x0,ji ij i i
Then expected sales and cross-delivery are= +== + ++ +
E sales E X Q E cross
E cross E X Q Q X
E cross E X Q Q X
( ) (min( , )) ( ),
( ) (min(( ) , ( ) )),
( ) (min(( ) , ( ) )).
i i i ji
ji i i j j
ij j j i i
The expected profit function of i is= + ++++ + + +
c Q
E r t Q Q X r t
X Q Q X X Q Q X
[( )( ( ) ) ( )
min(( ) , ( ) ) min(( ) , ( ) )],
i
CP
P i
i i i
i i j j j j i i
which is similar to the expected profit of a two location transshipment
systems with decentralized storage studied e.g. in Rudi et al. (2001).
The expected profit of i is concave in Qi and the first order condition of i
is: =++ +r t c r t F Q F Q( ) ( ) ( ) 0.P X Q X i X X Q i( ) ( )i j j i j j (3)
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium Q Q( , )i CP j CP* * which is char-
acterized by (3) (Rudi et al., 2001, Proposition 1).
Lemma 1. The retailers' optimal inventory levels Qi CP* and Qj CP* are
increasing in the compensation cost τ.
That is, a decentralized retailer i increases its stock with increasing
compensation cost τ paid to j for using his pool, as retailer i’s stockout
cost increase while his leftover cost decrease. This is illustrated in Fig. 2
for the case of two independent gamma distributed demands with mean
10 and a coefficient of variation of 0.5. Note that the results throughout
the paper are obtained via simulation optimization.
If the system is controlled by a central decision maker then complete
pooling reduces to a problem with a single decision variable. The total
expected profit from ordering Q units to the pool is given by= +r t c Q r t E Q X X( ) ( ) ( ) .CP c p i j,
The expected profit is concave and the optimal order quantity under
centralized control Q CP c* , is found by solving the first order condition=+r t c r t F Q( ) ( ) 0,P X Xi j (4)
Hence, = + ( )Q FCP c X X r t cr t* , 1i j P , where r t cr t P is the critical ratio of
the (centralized) complete pooling scenario.
Proposition 1. For = 0 the total inventory in the decentralized system is
lower than in the centralized systems, i.e. + <Q Q Qi CP j CP CP c* * * , .
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 is that the decen-
tralized system is not coordinated if = 0, i.e. the retailers do not make
system optimal (i.e. centralized) decisions. The retailers' inventory le-
vels are too low. Since the retailers’ optimal inventory levels are in-
creasing in τ (Lemma 1) we propose τ as a mechanism to coordinate the
decentralized system. In other words, we want to find a particular
compensation cost * that induces the retailers to make system optimal
inventory decisions. The result is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The coordinating compensation cost that results in the
highest expected profit under complete pooling is given by
= ++++ + +r t F Q r t F Q QF Q F Q( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) .X Q X i
CP c
X X i
CP c
j
CP c
X Q X i
CP c
X X Q i
CP c
* ( )
* , * , * ,
( )
* ,
( )
* ,
i j j i j
i j j i j j (5)
For symmetric retailers with =F FX Xi j we know that
Fig. 2. Best response functions and Nash equilibria for = 0 and = 0.6:= = =r c t2, 0.3, 0P .
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= =Q Q Q /2i CP c j CP c CP c* , * , * , . Hence, in the case of two symmetric retailers
the coordinating compensation cost can be uniquely determined and
always exists (Hu et al., 2007, Theorem 1). The coordinating
compensation cost with varying transportation cost t and order cost
cP are reported in Table 2 (again for the case of two independent
gamma distributed demands with mean 10 and a coefficient of
variation of 0.5). We see that,
Observation 1. The coordinating compensation cost * given in (5) is
increasing in cP and decreasing in t.
5. Partial pooling
In this section we analytically and numerically discuss the partial
pooling model discussed in Section 3.
5.1. Partial pooling: decentralized control
For partial pooling with two independent retailers we consider ten
distinct cases listed below in order to obtain the expected profit of re-
tailer i. A graphical illustration of the possible cases is given in Fig. 3.
We define Ti as the number of units retailer i uses from its own con-
tribution to the pool. Then:
1. If x qi i and +x q Qj j j =sales xi i, = =cross cross 0ij ji , =T 0i
2. If +q x q Qi i i i and +x q Qj j j =sales xi i, = =cross cross 0ij ji ,=T x qi i i
3. If +q x q Qi i i i and + + + +q Q x q q Q Q xj j j i j i j i=sales xi i, = =cross x q Q cross, 0ij j j j ji , =T x qi i i
4. If x qi i and + + +q Q x q Q Qj j j j i j =sales xi i,= =cross x q Q cross, 0ij j j j ji , =T 0i
5. If x qi i and + +q Q Q xj i j j =sales xi i, = =cross Q cross, 0ij i ji ,=T 0i
6. If +q x q Qi i i i and + + +x q q Q Q xj i j i j i =sales xi i,= =cross q Q x cross, 0ij i i i ji , =T x qi i i
7. If + + +q Q x q Q Qi i i i i j and + + +x q q Q Q xj i j i j i=sales xi i, = =cross cross x q Q0,ij ji i i i, =T Qi i
8. If + +q Q Q xi i j i and x qj j = + +sales q Q Qi i i j,= =cross cross Q0,ij ji j, =T Qi i
9. If +q Q xi i i and + + + +q q Q Q x x x q Q,i j i j i j j j j
= + + +sales q q Q Q xi i j i j j, = = +cross cross q Q x0,ij ji j j j,=T Qi i
10. If +x q Qi i i and +x q Qj j j = +sales q Qi i i, = =cross cross 0ij ji ,=T Qi i
Expected sales and (cross-)delivery of retailer i are given by
= + += += +=
+ +
+ +
+
E sales E X q Q E cross
E cross E X q Q q Q X Q
E cross E X q Q q Q X Q
E T E X q Q
( ) (min( , )) ( )
( ) (min(( ) , min(( ) , )))
( ) (min(( ) , min(( ) , )))
( ) (min(( ) , ))
i i i i ji
ji i i i j j j j
ij j j j i i i i
i i i i
The expected profit function of retailer i is given by
= + ++ ++ +
++ +
+ +
c Q c q E r X q Q t X q Q
r t E X q Q q Q X Q
E X q Q q Q X Q
( min( , ) min(( ) , ))
( ) (min(( ) , min(( ) , )))
(min(( ) , min(( ) , ))).
i P i R i i i i i i i
i i i j j j j
j j j i i i i (6)
One can also write the expected profit of i as
= + + ++ ++ + +
+ +
+ +
+ + + +
c Q c q E r q Q q Q X t X q
t X q Q r t X q Q X q Q
q Q X q X q Q q X X
( (( ) ( ) ) ( )
( ) ( )(( ) ( ))
(( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ))
,
i P i R i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
n
i i
i i i i i i i i i i
e
where we define = + + = ++ + +X X q Q X q X X q Q X Q( ) ( ) min(( ) , )in i j j j j j i j j j j
and = + +X X X q Q( )ie i j j j .
Proposition 3. The expected profit function of retailer i given in (6) is
jointly concave in q Q( , )i i , so a Nash equilibrium exists and is characterized
by the following first order conditions:
= +
< + < =q
r c r t F q Q F q
Pr X q Q q X
( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) 0,
i
i
R X i i X i
i
e
i i i i
i
n i
(7)
= + + =+ +Q r t c r t F q Q F q Q( ) ( ) ( ) 0.ii P X i i X q X i i( )in ie i i
(8)
We are now interested in finding conditions such that >=| 0ddQ Q 0ii i ,which will indicate that =Q 0i is not optimal. If we assume symmetric
retailers and independent demands we have
= + +=Q t r F q F q r t c| ( ) ( ) ( ( ))i Q P0 2
If = 0 we need < ( )q F r t cr t1 p to have >=| 0Q Q 0i . In agreement
with intuition, if q is small, Q should not be zero. That is also qualita-
tively true for > 0, but the ratio is more complicated. Note that r t c
r t
p
is the critical ratio of a centralized complete pooling model.
5.2. Partial pooling: central control
If the partial pooling system is centrally managed the decisions of
such a system are q q,i j and Q. The total expected delivery from the pool
to the retailers is given by= ++ +E T E Q X q X q( ) (min( , ( ) ( ) )).i i j j
The total expected profit under centralized control is
= + + ++ ++ +c q q c Q r E X q E X qr t E Q X q X q( ) ( min( , ) min( , ))( ) (min( , ( ) ( ) )c R i j P i i j ji i j j (9)
From this we have the following.
Proposition 4. i) For the centralized problem the first order necessary
conditions are
Table 2
Coordinating compensation cost *: =r 2.
c tP 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.3 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.59
0.4 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.67
0.5 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.75
Fig. 3. Ten distinct cases of partial pooling.
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= +
< < =
+ +
q
r c tF q r t Pr X q X q
Q q X
( ) ( ) (( ) ( )
, ) 0
c
i
R X i i i j j
i i
i
(10)
= + < =+ +
Q
r t c r t Pr X q X q Q( ) (( ) ( ) ) 0.
c
P i i j j (11)
ii) For symmetric retailers the total expected profit under centralized control
given in (9) is jointly concave in q q Q( , , )i j .
Hence, for symmetric retailers there is a global optimal solution
q q Q, ,i
c
j
c c* * * maximizing (9), found by solving the system of first order
conditions (10) and (11).
5.3. Numerical analysis
We perform a numerical analysis to gain additional insights into the
partial pooling model. In particular, we are interested how the com-
pensation cost which has been specified in advance of the inventory
game, affects the optimal order quantities and profits. We want to
compare the model with individual decision making to a centrally
controlled model and discuss how demand correlation affects the re-
tailers partial pooling quantities.
We assume that the demands are gamma distributed with a mean of
10 and a coefficient of variation of 0.5. Unless otherwise stated, we
assume independent demands and retail price and purchase cost at the
pool are fixed to =r 2 and =c 0.3P .
5.3.1. Impact of cost parameters on optimal order quantities and expected
profits
An overview of the optimal partial pooling strategy varying pur-
chase cost cR, transportation cost t and compensation cost τ is given in
Table 3 where (simulated) optimal order quantities are rounded. From
Table 3 we can make the following intuitive observations.
Observation 2. For the models of decentralized and centralized control,
with decreasing t, the optimal inventory level at the pool increases while the
optimal inventory level at the retail locations decreases.
Our numerical results show that the analytical results of the com-
plete pooling case also hold for partial pooling which is also intuitive:
Observation 3. The retailers increase their contribution to the pool with
increasing compensation cost τ.
Again τ can be used as a mechanism to coordinate the partial
pooling system, i.e. inducing the retailers to make centralized inventory
decisions.
If we compare the optimal policy of decentralized control with that
of centralized control, we see that generally when τ is not that high the
total inventory quantity of the pool is higher under centralized control,
i.e. +Q Q Qi j c* * * where =Q Qi j* * (see Table 3). This result is intuitive,
as the decentralized retailer cannot benefit from full risk sharing which
would be possible under centralized control. Consequently, the retailers
are more cautious and rely more on their local inventories at the store.
Figs. 4 and 5 show the impact of increasing τ on the optimal ex-
pected profits of i and j, respectively, exemplary for two scenarios:= = = =r c c t2, 0.3, 0.3, 0.1P R and = = = =r c c t2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.2P R .
Comparing the expected profits of the decentralized system with the
centralized system the numerical results confirm the following (see
Fig. 5 b)):
Observation 4. An appropriate compensation cost τ can coordinate the
partial pooling system.
Further, comparing partial pooling with no pooling or complete
Table 3
Optimal order quantities of partial pooling under decentralized and centralized
control: = =r c2, 0.3P .
t τ =c 0.2R =c 0.3R =c 0.4R
qi
* Qi* qi
c* Q c* qi
* Qi* qi
c* Q c* qi
* Qi* qi
c* Q c*
0.1 0 17 0 14 4 15 0 9 10 0 15 1 26
0.3 17 0 14 4 13 2 9 10 0 12 1 26
0.6 17 0 14 4 11 3 9 10 0 12 1 26
0.9 17 0 14 4 11 4 9 10 1 14 1 26
1.2 17 0 14 4 11 4 9 10 1 14 1 26
0.2 0 17 0 15 2 15 0 11 7 9 4 8 12
0.3 17 0 15 2 15 0 11 7 9 4 8 12
0.6 17 0 15 2 13 2 11 7 8 5 8 12
0.9 17 0 15 2 12 3 11 7 8 6 8 12
1.2 17 0 15 2 12 3 11 7 8 6 8 12
0.3 0 17 0 16 1 15 0 12 6 11 2 9 9
0.3 17 0 16 1 15 0 12 6 11 3 9 9
0.6 17 0 16 1 14 1 12 6 10 4 9 9
0.9 17 0 16 1 13 2 12 6 10 4 9 9
1.2 17 0 16 1 13 2 12 6 10 5 9 9
Fig. 4. Optimal expected profits varying τ: = = = =r c c t2, 0.3, 0.3, 0.1P R .
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pooling we have the following observation:
Observation 5. The retailers can achieve higher expected profits under
partial pooling than under no pooling or complete pooling.
Consequently partial pooling can be indeed optimal in a decen-
tralized system and the benefits from partial pooling can be significant
(see Figs. 4 and 5). This result illustrate the practical relevance of such a
partial pooling system which probably occurs quite often in practice.
5.3.2. Property of optimal solution: boundary vs. inner solution
For relatively low transportation cost t and compensation cost τ,
respectively, it is likely that the optimal policy in the decentralized
model is a boundary solution, i.e. either no pooling is optimal if cR is
low compared to cP or complete pooling is optimal if cR is high com-
pared to cP (see Table 3). In the following we analyze, how likely it is to
observe a boundary solution. We consider an extended numerical de-
sign shown in Table 4 where we analyze high-profit product settings as
well as low-profit product settings (i.e. newsvendor ratios r c
r
R more
and less than F µ( ), respectively).
For the models of decentralized and centralized control, Table 5
summarizes whether a boundary solution (NP or CP) or an inner solu-
tion is optimal. Interestingly we see from Table 5 that.
Observation 6. The solution is more often inner one with a centralized
control than with a decentralized one.
Indeed, the difference between cR and cP has to be very large in
order to obtain situations where a boundary solution is optimal in a
model with central control. Further, comparing high-profit and low-
profit settings from Table 5 we observe that for the decentralized
model.
Observation 7. In a high-profit product setting it is more likely that
complete pooling is optimal compared to a low-profit product setting.
To summarize, we see that there is a significant difference between
the decentralized and centralized model. Hence, local decision making
does affect the optimal inventory levels at the retailers and the pool, for
example, it induces the retailers to rely more on their inventories at the
retail level.
5.3.3. Impact of demand correlation
So far our numerical examples are based on the assumption that
demands are independent. As demand dependence is a critical issue in
inventory pooling we illustrate the impact of correlation on the optimal
order quantities in Fig. 6. We use a Gaussian copula for the joint dis-
tribution with gamma distributed marginals (mean 10 and coefficient of
variation 0.5 as in the examples before). This implies a linear depen-
dence (i.e. correlation) between the demands that is expressed by
[ 1,1]. For more details on copulas we refer to e.g. Silbermayr et al.
(2017). We observe the following:
Observation 8. For the model of decentralized and centralized control, the
inventory level at the retailer qi* increases, while the inventory level at the
pool Qi* decreases with increasing correlation coefficient ρ.
The benefit of pooling decreases as ρ increases, consequently the
retailers will increase the order quantities at the retail locations. As ρ
approaches 1, the inventory at the pool approaches zero, while the
inventory at the retailers approach qi NP* . However, from Fig. 6, we see
that the decreasing effect of ρ on the inventories is weaker in the de-
centralized system than in the centralized system. Additionally, while
for = 0.9 in Fig. 6 the decentralized retailers will contribute nothing
to the pool (i.e. no pooling is optimal), in the centralized system it is
still optimal to store a part of the inventory in the pool. This implies
that for independent retailers it will be more likely that the optimal
Fig. 5. Optimal expected profits varying τ: = = = =r c c t2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.2P R .
Table 4
Summary of parameter values with in total 150 instances.
r 2
t {0.1,0.2,0.3}
τ {0,0.3,0.6,0.9,1.2}
high-profit setting low-profit setting
cP 0.3 1.5
cR {0.2,0.25,0.3,0.35,0.4} {1.4,1.45,1.5,1.55,1.6}
r cR
t
[0.8,0.9] [0.2,0.3]
Table 5
Number of numerical instances (in %) where NP, CP or PP is optimal.
NP optimal CP optimal Inner solution optimal
high-profit setting
decentralized model 38.7% 2.7% 58.7%
centralized model 0% 0% 100%
low-profit setting
decentralized model 61.3% 0% 38.6%
centralized model 0% 0% 100%
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partial pooling policy will result in no pooling, especially when demand
correlation is very high.
5.4. Managerial insights
From the numerical examples the following managerial insights
based on the modelling framework of partial risk pooling introduced in
Section 3 can be derived.
From the analysis in Section 5.3.1, it can be observed that the
practice of partial pooling can be more beneficial for the retailers than
no pooling or complete pooling (i.e. no local storage). Hence, the col-
laborative activity of physically pooling part of the inventory in order to
deal with high demand uncertainty can be beneficial for independent
retailers. The retailers should increase their inventory levels at the pool
(and at the same time decrease their inventory at the retail levels) as the
unit order cost at the retail level increases or the unit transportation
cost from the warehouse to the customers decreases (see Table 3 and
Observations 2 and 5).
From the managerial perspective, it is important to notice that the
retailers should increase their inventory quantities at the warehouse as
the per unit compensation cost for using the other retailers surplus
stock increases (see Table 3 and Observation 3). Indeed, if the com-
pensation cost is set appropriately then the partial pooling system can
induce decentralized retailers to achieve the centralized optimal solu-
tion where the aggregated profit is maximized (Fig. 5 and Observation
4). Consequently, in practice given the important role of the compen-
sation cost in the system, decision makers that are able to control this
cost should be aware that the compensation costs, appropriately set,
can be used as a mechanism to coordinate such a decentralized system.
In Section 5.3.2 we quantitatively show that there can be a sig-
nificant difference between the situation of individual and central de-
cision making (Observation 6). The reason is that, independent decision
making implies that the retailers are not able to fully exploit the risk
pooling benefit. As a result the retailers will rely more on their in-
ventory at the local storage facilities.
The analysis in Section 5.3.3, where we discuss the impact of de-
mand correlation between independent retailers shows the well known
result that the advantage of risk pooling decreases as the correlation
between the demands increases. The optimal inventory at the ware-
house decreases as correlation increases (Observation 8) and ap-
proaches zero as correlation approaches one. However, independent
retailers maximizing their own profits will reach a no pooling strategy
faster compared to a system managed by a central decision maker
maximizing the aggregate profit (see Fig. 6). This is again due to the
fact that independent decision maker maximizing their own profits are
not able to fully exploit the pooling benefit. It is important to recognize
such inefficiencies in practice situations in order to being able to im-
prove performance of the whole supply chain.
To summarize, our analysis provides first insights into the benefits
of a partial pooling system with inventory managers acting individually
in order to understand the impact of the system's cost parameters and
demand correlation structure on the optimal inventory levels and as-
sociated profits compared to a centrally coordinated system.
6. Conclusion
Motivated by an inventory pooling strategy that is quite prevalent in
practice, we have developed a formal model of partially pooling in-
ventories, where two independent firms pool some of their inventory
which can be shared at a central warehouse, while keeping the rest at
their local storage facilities. Our model appears to be the first con-
tribution to this field and as obtaining analytical results is difficult, we
display numerical results. We prove existence of a Nash equilibrium in
such an inventory system and analyze the performance of partial
pooling by comparing it to a model with centralized control. We show
that local decision making instead of central decision making strongly
impacts the optimal inventory policy in a partial pooling scenario.
However, we find that setting an appropriate compensation cost for
using the other firms contribution to the pool can induce the retailers to
achieve system optimal (centralized) solutions. We also compare the
optimal partial pooling strategy to the special cases of no pooling and
complete pooling and discuss situations where it is likely that one of the
special cases will be optimal. Our results confirm that partial pooling
can indeed significantly outperform no pooling and complete pooling,
which indicates the practical relevance of pooling some, but not all,
inventories at a central storage location.
In our model we have assumed that lateral transshipments between
the retailers are not possible. However, the model could be easily ex-
tended to any situation where delivering an item from the warehouse to
a retailer is less expensive than lateral transshipments, but lateral
transshipments are still beneficial (i.e. less costly than the retailers
revenue). For the sequence of events it would imply that transshipments
occur only whenever the inventory at the warehouse has been fully
used up. The structural results discussed in this paper, however, would
still hold in such situations.
In this paper we have focused on a system with two independent
firms. Studying a system with more than two independent players and
finding appropriate allocation rules for sharing the pool is a promising
research field.
Appendix A. Discrete demand example
Suppose that X1 and X2 are independent and identically distributed, with
=X ps
p s
0, w.p.
1, w.p.
2, w.p. 1 ,
i
(12)= >i p s1,2, , 0 and +p s 1. This example was considered by Gerchak (2017) for a centralized system.
Fig. 6. Optimal order quantities varying demand correlation coefficient ρ:= = = = =r c c t2, 0.3, 0.3, 0.1, 0.3P R .
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Assume a symmetric equilibrium q Q q Q(( , ), ( , )).
For each q Q( , ) used by a retailer, we check conditions on the parameters r c c p s( , , , , )R P such that the same q Q( , ) is optimal for the other retailer.
We provide only a summary of the conditions.
We have the following possible (symmetric) Nash equilibria =N q Q( , ) and resulting expected profits E ( ) of a retailer:
1. =N (0,0)1 and =E ( ) 01
2. =N (1,0)2 and =E r p c( ) (1 ) R2
3. =N (0,1)3 and = + + + =E r p s p p s p s c p p s p s p r ps p c( ) [(1 )2 (1 )(1 ) ] (1 ) (1 ) (1 )P P3 2
4. =N (1,1)4 and = + =E r p s s c c r p s c c( ) [(1 )2 ] (2 2 )R P R P4
5. =N (2,0)5 and =E r p s c( ) (2 2 ) 2 R5
6. =N (0,2)6 and =E r p s c( ) (2 2 ) 2 P6
Thus.
1. ((0,0), (0,0)) is an equilibrium if: c cR P and <r cps p1 P 2 or c cR P and <r c p1 R
2. ((1,0), (1,0)) is an equilibrium if c cR P and < <rc p cp s1 1R R
3. ((0,1), (0,1)) is an (altruistic) equilibrium if: c cP R and < < + +rcps p cp ps p s1 1 2P P2 2
4. ((1,1), (1,1)) is not an equilibrium, as (1,1) cannot be a better response than both (2,0) and (0,2) since one requires <c cP R and the other >c cP R
5. ((2,0), (2,0)) is an equilibrium if: c cR P and >r cp s1 R
6. ((0,2), (0,2)) is an equilibrium if: c cP R and > + +r cp s ps p1 2 P 2
We can summarize the results as follows:
Suppose c cR P. Then, if <r cps p1 P 2 the equilibrium is N1. If < < + +rcps p cp ps p s1 1 2P P2 2 the equilibrium is N3. Otherwise, if > + +r cp ps p s1 2P2 ,
the equilibrium is N6.
Suppose c cR P. Then, if <r c p1 R the equilibrium is N1. If < <rc p cp s1 1R R the equilibrium is N2. Otherwise, if >r cp s1 R , the equilibrium is N5.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. This immediately follows from (3).
Proof of Proposition 1.We know that =+F Q( )X X C r t cr ti j p . Now for = 0 we have: = +r t E X Q r t E cross c Q( ) min( , ) ( ) ( )i i i ji P i. The expectedquantity cross-delivered can be written as (see e.g. Dong and Rudi, 2004; Shao et al., 2011):+ = + +E cross E cross E X X Q Q E X Q E X Q( ) ( ) min( , ) min( , ) min( , )ij ji i j i j i i j j . Hence, = + +E cross E X X Q Q E X Q E X Q E cross( ) min( , ) min( , ) min( , ) ( )ji i j i j i i j j ij .
We can rewrite the retailers expected profit as = + +r t E X X Q Q r t E X Q r t E cross j c Q( ) min( , ) ( ) min( , ) ( ) ( )i i j i j j j i P i.
Now, the first derivative is = + < + > + =+r t F Q Q r t P X Q X X Q Q c( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( , ) 0ddQ X X i j i i i j i j Pii i j . Consequently,+ = < + > + < = + <+ +F Q Q P X Q X X Q Q F Q Q Q Q( ) ( , ) ( )X X i j r t cr t i i i j i j r t cr t X X C i j Ci j p p i j .
Proof of Proposition 2. * is found by equating the left-hand side of (3) evaluated at = +Q Q QCP c i CP c j CP c* , * , * , with the left-hand side of (4).
Proof of Proposition 3. The expected profit function can be written as
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In order to prove that i is jointly concave in q Q( , )i i , it is necessary to show that the determinants of H alternate in sign (starting from negative).
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Now,
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Proof of Proposition 4. If we consider partial pooling with centralized control we need to distinguish between 7 possible cases. The total expected
profit is = ++ + +
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The first order conditions are
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If we assume symmetric retailers we know that = =q q qi j , i.e. the optimization problem reduces to a two-dimensional problem and a policy is
denoted by q Q( , ). We have:
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From this the following inequalities hold:
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Consequently, ( ) 0q Q q Q 2c c c2 2 2 2 2 . Hence, the expected profit function is jointly concave in q q Q, ,i j for symmetric retailers.
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